Recently, Li et al. proposed a novel smart card and dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments. They claimed that their scheme can resist several types of attacks. However, through careful analysis, we find that Li et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and off-line dictionary attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and server spoofing attacks. By analyzing other similar schemes, we find that a certain type of dynamic ID-based multi-server authentication scheme in which only hash functions are used and whereby no registration center participates in the authentication and session key agreement phase faces difficulties in providing perfectly efficient and secure authentication. To compensate for these shortcomings, we propose a novel dynamic IDbased remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments based on pairing and self-certified public keys. Security and performance analyses show that the proposed scheme is secure against various attacks and has many excellent features.
Introduction
With the rapid development of network technologies, increasingly more people are beginning to use networks to acquire various services such as on-line financial information, on-line medical information, on-line shopping, on-line bill payment, and on-line documentation and data exchange. In addition, the architecture of servers providing services to be accessed over a network often consists of many different servers around the world instead of just one. Although they currently enjoy the comfort and convenience of the internet, people are facing emerging challenges with regard to network security.
Identity authentication is the key security issue facing various types of on-line applications and service systems. Before a user accesses services provided by a service provider server, mutual identity authentication between the user and server is needed to prevent unauthorized PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202657 October 9, 2018 1 / 19 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111 a1111111111
protocol for multi-server architectures to resolve the security flaws of Hsiang and Shih's scheme [13] . In addition, Sood et al.'s protocol is practical and computationally efficient because only nonce, one-way hash functions and XOR operations are used in its implementation. After that, Li et al. [14] noted that Sood et al.'s protocol remains vulnerable to leak-ofverifier attacks, stolen smart card attacks and impersonation attacks. Simultaneously, Li et al. [14] proposed another dynamic identity-based authentication protocol for multi-server architectures. However, the above-mentioned schemes are all RC-dependent multi-server authentication schemes. In 2009, Liao and Wang [15] proposed a dynamic ID-based multi-server authentication scheme that is based on hash functions and does not depend on RCs. This scheme not only satisfies all requirements for multi-server environments but also achieves efficient computation. However, Liao and Wang's scheme has been found to be vulnerable to insider attacks, masquerade attacks, server spoofing attacks, and registration center spoofing attacks and is not reparable [16] . Later, Shao et al. [17] and Lee et al. [18, 19] proposed similar types of multi-server authentication schemes. In 2012, Li et al. [20] noted that Lee et al.'s scheme [18] cannot withstand forgery attacks or server spoofing attacks and cannot provide proper authentication; they then proposed a novel dynamic ID-based multi-server authentication scheme that only uses a hash function and is not dependent on RCs. Moreover, the scheme is found to be suitable for financial security authentication. However, through careful analysis, we find that Li et al.'s scheme [20] remains vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and server spoofing attacks. We also analyzed Shao et al.'s scheme [17] and Lee et al.'s scheme [19] ; they are all vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and server spoofing attacks. In general, it is difficult to construct a secure dynamic IDbased and non-RC-dependent multi-server authentication scheme if only hash functions are used. Public-key cryptography is another useful technique that is widely used in the construction of multi-server authentication schemes. In 2000, Lee and Chang [21] proposed a user identification and key distribution scheme in which the difficulty of factorization on public key cryptography is used. In 2001, Tsaur [22] proposed a remote user authentication scheme based on an RSA cryptosystem and Lagrange interpolating polynomials for multi-server environments. Then, Lin et al. [23] proposed a multi-server authentication protocol based on the simple geometric properties of the Euclidean and discrete logarithm problem concept. In their scheme, the system does not need to maintain a verification table, and the users who have registered with the servers do not need to remember different login passwords for various servers. Since traditional public key cryptographic algorithms require many expensive computations and consume substantial energy, Geng and Zhang [24] proposed a dynamic ID-based user authentication and key agreement scheme for multi-server environments using bilinear pairings. However, Geng and Zhang's scheme cannot withstand user spoofing attacks [25] . Later, Tseng et al. [26] proposed an efficient pairing-based user authentication scheme with smart cards. Performance analysis and experimental data demonstrate that their scheme is well suited for mobile devices with limited computing capabilities. However, in 2013, Liao and Hsiao [27] noted that Tseng et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to insider attacks, offline dictionary attacks and malicious server attacks and cannot provide proper mutual authentication and session key agreement. Simultaneously, Liao and Hsiao proposed a novel non-RC-dependent multi-server remote user authentication scheme using self-certified public keys for mobile clients [27] . Recently, Chou et al. [28] found that Liao and Hsiao's scheme cannot withstand password guessing attacks. Furthermore, through careful analysis, we found that Liao and Hsiao's scheme remains vulnerable to denial of service attacks and cannot ensure a user's anonymity or provide local password verification. In this paper, we propose a secure dynamic ID-based and non-RC-dependent multi-server authentication scheme using pairing and self-certified public keys.
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the concepts of bilinear pairings, self-certified public keys, as well as some related mathematical assumptions.
Bilinear pairings
Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group with a large prime order q, and let G 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group with the same order q. In particular, G 1 is a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field E(F p ), and G 2 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group over a finite field. P is a generator of G 1 .
A bilinear pairing is a map e: G 1 × G 1 ! G 2 and satisfies the following properties:
(1) Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q 2 G 1 and a; b 2 Z Ã q . (2) Non-degenerate: There exists P, Q 2 G 1 such that e(P, Q)6 ¼1. (3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q 2 G 1 .
Self-certified public keys
In [27] , Liao et al. first proposed a key distribution scheme based on self-certified public keys (SCPKs) [38, 39] among the service servers. Using the SCPK, a user's public key can be computed directly from the signature of the trusted third party (TTP) on the user's identity instead of verifying the public key using an explicit signature on a user's public key. The SCPK scheme is described as follows.
(1) Initialization: The trusted third party (TTP) first generates all the needed parameters of the scheme. The TTP chooses a non-singular high elliptic curve E(F p ) defined over a finite field, which is used with a point-based generator P of prime order q. Then, the TTP freely chooses his/her secret key s T and computes his/her public key pub T = s T Á P. The related parameters and pub T are publicly and authentically available. 
Related mathematical assumptions
To prove the security of our proposed protocol, we present some important mathematical problems and assumptions for bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves. The related concrete description can be found in [40, 41] .
(1) Computational discrete logarithm (CDL) problem: Given R = x Á P, where P, R 2 G 1 , it is easy to calculate R given x and P, but it is hard to determine x given P and R.
(2) Elliptic curve factorization (ECF) problem: Given two points P and R = x Á P + y Á P for x; y 2 Z
Review and cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s authentication scheme

Review of Li et al.'s scheme
There are three participants in Li et al.'s scheme: the registration center RC, the server S j , and the user U i . RC generates the master secret key x and a secret number y to construct h(xky) and h(SID j kh(y)), in which SID j is the identity of server S j ; then, it delivers them to the server S j through a secure channel. Li et al.'s scheme contains four phases:the registration phase, the login phase, the verification phase and the password change phase.
Registration phase. When the remote user authentication scheme starts, the registration process should be first performed by the user U i and RC:
(1) U i generates a random number b and freely chooses his/her identity ID i and the password PW i . Then, U i calculates A i = h(b È PW i ). After that, U i transmits ID i and A i to RC for registration through a secure channel.
(
, h(y)} on the smart card of U i and sends it to U i by a secure channel.
(3) U i adds the random number b into the smart card, which ultimately possesses the infor-
Login phase. When user U i wants to log into the server S j , the following procedures should be performed:
(1) After the smart card is inserted into the card reader, the user is prompted to enter his/ her ID i and PW i . After that, the smart card calculates
is equal to C i , the Login process continues. Otherwise, the session will be aborted.
(2) The smart card produces a number N i randomly and calculates
The smart card transmits the login request message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } to S j . Verification phase. When S j receives the login request message, the mutual authentication and session key agreement between S j and U i will be performed in accordance with the following steps.
(2) The server S j calculates h(P ij kCID i kD i kN i ); if the calculated result is not equal to M 1 , S j rejects the login request and aborts this session. Otherwise, S j accepts the login request message. Then, S j chooses a random number N j and calculates
If they are not equal, U i rejects these messages and terminates this session. Otherwise, U i successfully authenticates S j . In addition,
(4) The server S j computes h(D i kA i kN i kSID j ) and compares it with the received {M 5 } sent from U i . If they are equal, U i is successfully authenticated by S j , and the mutual authentication is completed. After the mutual authentication phase, the user U i and the server S j calculate SK = h(D i kA i kN i kN j kSID j ) as their session key in future secure communication.
Password change phase. For security, the password of the user should be changed frequently. The password change phase is performed when user U i wants to replace the old password PW i with a new password PW new i .
(1) The user U i inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and inputs his/her ID i and PW i .
(2) The smart card calculates 
Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s scheme
Li et al. claimed that their scheme can resist many types of attacks and satisfy all the essential requirements for multi-server architecture authentication. However, if we assume that A is an adversary who has broken a user U m and a server S n or a combination of a malicious user U m and a dishonest server S n , then A can obtain the secret number h(xky) and h(y) and perform stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and server spoofing attacks on Li et al.'s scheme. The concrete cryptanalysis of the Li et al.'s scheme is shown as follows.
Stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks. If a user U i 's smart card is stolen by an adversary A, A can extract the information {C
i , D i , E i , b, h(Á), h(y)} from the memory of the sto- len smart card. Furthermore, if A intercepts a valid login request message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } sent from user U i to server S j in the public communication channel, A can compute N i = h (SID j kh(y)) È M 2 , E i = P ij È h(h(SID j kh(y))kN i ), B i = E i È h(xky), D i = h(B i kh(xky)) and A i = CID i È h(D i kSID j kN i )
using h(y) and h(xky).
Then, A can launch an offline dictionary attack on C i = h(ID i kh(y)kA i ) to determine the identity ID i of user U i because A knows the values of A i and h(y) corresponding to the user U i . In addition, A can launch offline dictionary attacks on A i = h(b È PW i ) to determine the password PW i of U i because A knows the value of b from the stolen smart card of the user U i . Now, A possesses the valid smart card of user U i , knows the identity ID i and password PW i corresponding to user U i and hence can login to any service provider server.
Replay attacks. A replay attack is when an adversary replays the same message of a receiver or sender again. If adversary A has intercepted a valid login request message {P ij , CID i , g. This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the user U i and the service provider server S j , and the login request is accepted. Finally, after mutual authentication, adversary A masquerading as the user U i and the server S j agree on the common session key as SK = h(D i kA i kN i kN j kSID j ). Therefore, the adversary A can masquerade as user U i to login to server S j by replaying the same login request message that had been sent from U i to S j . Impersonation attacks. In this subsection, we show that an adversary A who possesses h(y) and h(xky) can masquerade as any user U i to login to any server S j as follows.
Adversary A chooses two random numbers a i and b i and computes A i = h(a i ) and
and h(xky). Now, A sends the login request message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } by masquerading as the user U i to server S j . After receiving the login request message, S j computes i kN i kSID j ) and checks it against the received message {M 5 }. This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the user U i and the service provider server S j , and the login request is accepted. Finally, after mutual authentication, adversary A masquerading as the user U i and the server S j agree on the common session key as SK = h (D i kA i kN i kN j kSID j ) .
Server spoofing attacks. In this subsection, we show that an adversary A who possesses h(y) and h(xky) can masquerade as the server S j to spoof user U i if A has intercepted a valid login request message {P ij , CID i , M 1 , M 2 } sent from user U i to server S j over a public communication channel.
After intercepting a valid login request message {P ij , 
Discussion
Except for Li et al.'s scheme, we also analyzed four other dynamic ID-based authentication schemes for multi-server environments [15, [17] [18] [19] . These schemes are all based on hash functions and are not dependent on RCs. We found that this type of multi-server remote user authentication scheme is generally vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, impersonation attacks, server spoofing attacks etc. The cryptanalysis methods used by these schemes are similar to that of Li et al.'s scheme shown in Section 4.2. We believe that under the assumptions that no RC participates in the authentication and session key agreement phase, the dynamic ID and hash function-based user authentication schemes for multiserver environments face difficulties in providing perfectly efficient and secure authentication. Fortunately, there is another technique, public-key cryptography, that is widely used in the construction of authentication schemes. Therefore, to construct a secure, low-powerconsumption and non-RC-dependent authentication scheme, we adopt the elliptic curve cryptographic technology of public-key techniques, and we propose a novel dynamic ID-based and non-RC-dependent remote user authentication scheme using pairing and self-certified public keys for multi-server environments.
The proposed scheme
In this section, we propose a novel dynamic ID-based and non-RC-dependent remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments using pairing and self-certified public keys. Our scheme contains three participants: the user U i , the service provider server S j , and the registration center RC. A legitimate user U i can easily login to the service provider server using his smart card, identity and password. There are six phases in the proposed scheme: the system initialization phase, the user registration phase, the server registration phase, the login phase, the authentication and session key agreement phase, and the password change phase. The notations used in our proposed scheme are summarized in Table 1 .
System initialization phase
In the proposed scheme, the registration center RC is assumed to be a TTP. In the system initialization phase, RC generates all the needed parameters of the scheme.
(1) The RC selects a cyclic additive group G 1 of prime order q, a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 of the same order q, a generator P of G 1 , and a bilinear map e:
(2) The RC freely chooses a number s RC 2 Z Ã q held as the system private key and computes pub RC = s RC Á P as the system public key.
3) The RC selects two cryptographic hash functions H(Á) and h(Á).
Finally, all the related parameters {e, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, Pub RC , H(Á), h(Á)} are publicly and authentically available.
User registration phase
When the user U i wants to access the services, he/she has to submit some of his/her related information to the registration center RC for registration. The steps of the user registration phase are as follows:
(1) U i freely generates his/her identity ID i and password pw i and chooses a random number b i . Then, U i computes HPW i = h(ID i k pw i k b i ) Á P and submits ID i and HPW i to RC for registration through a secure channel. 
U i
The ith user.
ID i
The identity of the user U i .
S j
The jth service provider server.
SID j
The identity of the service provider server S j .
RC
The registration center.
s RC
The master secret key of the registration center RC in Z Ã q . pub RC The public key of RC, pub RC = s RC Á P.
P
A generator of group G 1 .
H()
, where k is the output length. h() allows the concatenation of some integer values and points on an elliptic curve.
È
A simple XOR operation in G 1 . If P 1 , P 2 2 G 1 , P 1 and P 2 are points on an elliptic curve over a finite field, the operation P 1 È P 2 means that it performs the XOR operations of the x-coordinates and y-coordinates of P 1 and P 2 , respectively. 
Server registration phase
If a service provider server S j wants to provide services to the users, he/she must perform the registration to the registration center RC to become a legal service provider server. The process of the server registration phase of the proposed scheme is based on SCPK.
(1) S j chooses a random number v j and computes V j = v j Á P. Then, S j submits SID j and V j to RC for registration via a secure channel.
(2) After receiving the message {SID j , V j }, RC chooses a random number w j and computes W j = w j Á P + V j and s 
The details of the user registration phase and server registration phase are shown in Fig 1. 
Login phase
If user U i wants to access the services provided by server S j , U i needs to login to S j , where the process of the login phase are as follows: (1 (2) The smart card chooses two random numbers u i and r i , and it computes DID i = u i Á QID i and R i = r i Á P. Then, the smart card sends the login request message {DID i , R i } to server S j over a public channel.
Authentication and session key agreement phase
(1) Based on the received login request message {DID i , R i } sent from the user U i , the server S j chooses a random number r j and computes Finally, the user U i and the server S j agree on a common session key as 
Password change phase
For security purposes, users need to change their passwords frequently. The following steps show the password change phase process for a user U i .
(1) The user U i inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader and inputs their identity ID i and password pw i . Then, the smart card computes
If they are equal, U i is verified as a legitimate user; otherwise, the smart card rejects the password change request. (2) The smart card generates a random number z i and computes Z i = z i Á P and AID i = CID i È z i Á pub RC . Then, the smart card sends the message {ID i , AID i , Z i } to the registration center RC.
(3) After receiving the message 
Security analysis
Stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks
In the proposed scheme, we assume that if a smart card is stolen, physical protection methods cannot prevent malicious attackers for obtaining the stored secure elements. Simultaneously, an adversary A can access a large dictionary of words that likely includes the user's password and intercept the communications between the user and server.
In the proposed scheme, if a user U i 's smart card is stolen by an adversary A, the latter can extract fReg ID i ; H i ; b i g from the memory of the stolen smart card. Simultaneously, it is assumed that adversary A has intercepted a previous full session of messages {DID i , R i , W j , R j , Auth ji , M i , B i } between the user U i and server S j . However, the adversary still cannot obtain U i 's identity ID i and password pw i except by guessing ID i and pw i simultaneously. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain U i 's identity ID i and password pw i from a stolen smart card and using offline dictionary attacks in our proposed scheme.
Replay attacks
Replaying a message of a previous session into a new session is useless in our proposed scheme because the user's smart card and the server choose different rand numbers r i and r j , and the user's identity is different in each new session. These factors make all messages dynamic and valid for that session only. If we assume that an adversary A replies with an intercepted previous login request {DID i , R i } to S j , after receiving the response message {W j , R j , Auth ji } sent from S j , A cannot compute the correct response message {M i , B i } to pass S j 's authentication since they do not know the values of ID i , pw i , u i and r i . Therefore, the proposed scheme is robust to replay attacks. 
Impersonation attacks
If an adversary A wants to masquerade as a legitimate user U i to pass the authentication of a server S j , the user must have the values of both QID i and CID i . However, QID i and CID i are protected by U i 's smart card, ID i and pw i since QID i = H(ID i ) and CID i ¼ Reg ID i È hðID i kpw i kb i Þ Á pub RC . Therefore, unless the adversary A can obtain the user U i 's smart card, ID i and pw i simultaneously, the proposed scheme is secure to impersonation attacks.
Server spoofing attacks
If an adversary A wants to masquerade as a legal server S j to cheat a user U i , the adversary must calculate a valid Auth ji that is embedded with the shared secret key K ji = s j Á R i to pass the authentication of U i . However, the adversary A cannot derive the shared secret key K ji without knowing the private key s j of the server S j . Therefore, our scheme is secure against server spoofing attacks.
Insider attacks
In the proposed scheme, the registration center RC cannot obtain U i 's password pw i . Since in the registration phase U i chooses a random number b i and sends ID i and HPW i = h(ID i k pw i k b i ) Á P to RC, RC cannot derive pw i from HPW i based on the CDL problem. Therefore, the proposed scheme is robust to insider attacks.
Denial of service attacks
In denial of service attacks, an adversary A updates the identity and password verification information on the smart card to some arbitrary value, and hence, legitimate users cannot login successfully in subsequent login requests to the server. In the proposed scheme, the smart card checks the validity of user U i 's identity ID i and password pw i before the password update procedure. An adversary can insert the stolen smart card of the user U i into the smart card reader and must guess the identity ID i and password pw i corresponding to the user U i correctly. The smart card computes H Ã i ¼ hðQID i kCID i Þ and compares it with the stored value of H i in its memory to verify the legitimacy of the user U i before the smart card accepts the password update request. It is not possible to guess the identity ID i and password pw i correctly simultaneously in real polynomial time even after obtaining the smart card of the user U i . Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against denial of service attacks.
Perfect forwarding secrecy
Perfect forwarding secrecy means that even if an adversary compromises all the passwords of the users, it still cannot compromise the session key. In the proposed scheme, the session key
is generated by three single-use random numbers u i , r i and r j in each session. These single-use random numbers are only held by the user U i and the server S j and cannot be retrieved from SK based on the security of the CDH problem. Thus, even if an adversary obtains previous session keys, it cannot compromise other session keys. Hence, the proposed scheme achieves perfect forwarding secrecy.
User anonymity
In our proposed scheme, the user U i 's login message is different in each login phase. For each login message, DID i = u i Á H(ID i ) is associated with a random number u i , which is known by U i alone. Therefore, no adversary can identity the real identity of the logged on user, and our scheme can ensure the user's anonymity.
No verification table
In our proposed scheme, it is obvious that the user, server and registration center do not maintain a verification table.
Local password verification
In the proposed scheme, the smart card checks the validity of user U i 's identity ID i and password pw i before logging into server S j . Since the adversary cannot compute the correct CID i without knowledge of ID i and pw i to satisfy the verification equation H Ã i ¼ H i , our scheme can avoid unauthorized access via local password verification.
Proper mutual authentication
In our scheme, the user first authenticates the server. U i sends the message {DID i , R i } to the server S j to establish a connection. After receiving the response message {W j , R j , Auth ji } sent from S j , U i computes T ij , pub j , K ij , and Auth ij and checks whether Auth ij = Auth ji . If they are equal, S j is authenticated by U i . Otherwise, U i stops to login to this server. Since 
Performance comparison and functionality analysis
In this section, we compare the performance and functionality of our proposed scheme with some previous schemes. To analyze the computation cost, some notations are defined as follows.
TG e : The time for executing a bilinear map operation, e:
TG mul : The time for executing point scalar multiplication on the group G 1 . Since the XOR operation and the modular multiplication operation require very few computations, it is usually negligible considering their computation costs. Table 2 shows the performance comparisons of our proposed scheme and various other related protocols. We focus on three computational costs: C1, the total time for all operations executed during the user registration phase; C2, the total time spent by the user during the login phase and verification phase; and C3, the total time spent by the server during the verification phase. As shown in Table 2 , Tseng et al.'s scheme is more efficient in terms of computational cost. However, Tseng et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, server spoofing attacks and insider attacks and cannot provide perfect forwarding secrecy, user anonymity, proper mutual authentication and session key agreement. In our proposed scheme, the total computational cost for the user (C2) is 9TG mul +TG H +TG add +5T h . However, similar to Liao et al.'s scheme, the user U i can pre-compute R i = r i Á P in the client, and then, the computational cost of the user (C2) requires 8TG mul +TG H +TG add +5T h on-line computations. It can be found that our proposed scheme has a slightly higher computational cost than Liao et al.'s scheme in C2, and the others are almost equal. However, Liao et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks and denial of service attacks and cannot provide user anonymity and local password verification. Table 3 lists the functionality comparisons among our proposed scheme and other related schemes. It is obvious that our scheme has many excellent features and is more secure than other related schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we note that Li et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks, replay attacks, impersonation attacks and server spoofing attacks. Furthermore, by analyzing some other similar schemes, we find that certain types of dynamic IDbased and non-RC-dependent multi-server authentication schemes in which only hash functions are used face difficulties in providing perfectly efficient and secure authentication. To compensate for these shortcomings, we propose a novel dynamic ID-based and non-RCdependent remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environments using pairing and self-certified public keys. The security and performance analyses show that the proposed scheme is secure against various attacks and has many excellent features. In the future, the Resist stolen smart card and offline dictionary attacks use of authentication for high-tech industries, such as cloud computing [42] [43] [44] and big data [44] [45] [46] , will be an important area and research task.
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